One WESTERN DISCOURSES ON AFRICA
The first condition 10 understand the problems and contents of African philosophy is to refer to Ihe coloni,11 narrative about Africa. the re being no doubt thai African philosophical rctlections arc all attempts 10 refute the degrading views developed in the West to justify shivery and colonialism. Central \0 Ihe colonial discourse and the justi fi c<ltioll of colonial rule is Ihe hierarchical notion of human races wi th its blunt promulg'll ion of the superiority of the while mee over HII other peoples. However. another facet of this Western discourse proved nagging in default of being equally innucntial. [t came out agllinst the colonial idea of hierarchy through the rejection of the notion of human mecs or the affirmation of non-gradablc pluralism. This chaptcr studics thcsc two aspectS of thc Western conception of Africa with thc vicw of layi ng the theoretical ground for the A friclln responses.
I. T he Invention of the "White Ma n"
Let mc begin by underlining that the Western ntlclllpl 10 degrade Africnns has requi red the prior embellishmcnt of the ··while man." Grant that Ihe notion of pri mitive Afric:! is a construct of Eurocelllric concepts. and the logical prccedence of the invcntion of the "white man" over the invention of Africa springs to mind, givcn that the invcntors must first believe lies about themselves before they give credence to thc demeani ng descriptions of Africans.
A. T he Prelogical as Opposed to the Rational
No need to go into fussy research to lay hands o n the method lLsed to invent the "white man." All the ingredients afe found in the thi nker who is universally believed to have codified the colonial discourse, namely, Lucien LCvyBruhl. One of the leading French ethnologists of his lime, Lcvy-13ruhl is the imthol" of i 'rilllitiVl! Mel/llIlit) ' and Now NtlliI'e.l" Think, two books in which by an ilrr:lY of argu ments and alleged facts he endeavors to draw il line of demarcation between the West and non-Western peoples. The leitmotif run ning lhrough his analyses is Ihat Ihe dominance of logieul thinki ng distinguishes Ihe "while man" fro m the rest of hu mank ind. Let us bricny revicw the main arguments.
To herald the radicill nalure of his study, I.-Cvy-Bruh! begins by stilling Ihe necd for a new tcrminology. [f we suppose that similar mentill functio ns arc found in all human aggregates. the Slime terminology cml be used with the
AFRICA'S QUEST FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF DECOLONIZATION
undersumding that "'savages' have minds more like those of children than of adults.,,1 But if we assume that otherness instead of immaturity characterizes thc non-Western peoples, then the terms and c1:!ssilications derived fro m the menl:!i study of Westerners "arc not suitable for those which differ from them: on the contrary, they .prove a source of confusion and error."! Confusion dissipates if the notion of "mystic" or "prelogicaf' mental :!ctivity is opposed to the logical thinki ng of the West?
One reason for not assimilating the thinking of non-Western peoples to childli ke mentality is their similarity to the "white man" in terms of physiological development. "Undoubtedly they have the same senses liS ours ... lind their cerebral structure is like our own," concedes Levy_B ruhl. 4 Bettcr still, outside the collecti ve representations, that is, when the primiti ve is taken as an individual, he finds that the primitive "will usually feel, argue and act as we should expect him to dO.,,3 't'o gel hold of the difference, we must venture, beyond the physical constitution or propertics, into the manner of thinking, into the strange laws governing the mind of the primitive.
What is most striking to Levy-Bruhl about the mystic, prelogic:ll character is the subsequent inability of the primitive mind to thi nk of the physical as physical. This means the prevention of purc cognitive representations in favor of collective representations in which the cognitive clement "is fou nd blended with other clements of an emotional or motor character, coloured and imbued by them, and therefore implying:! different attitude with regard to the objects represented.,,6 Whereas in the West pure intellectual concepls are obtained through the retention of the cognitive element 10 the detriment of the affective side, in non-Western societies some such purilication is not sought so that a cognitive attitude toward objects is never achieved. The mixture of intellectual clements with affective reactions postulates occult forces, which hinder the apprehension of material phenomena in a physicnl and causal fashion. Not only are these mystic entities imperceptible to the senses, but they also induce the mind to arrange concepts with a total disregard fo r the elementary laws of logic. Thus, the same entity can be classified both as a person ;lIld an animal. just as the same person can be simultaneously in two different places. or be objectively active in reality as well as in dreams.
For Levy-Bruhl, prelogicality and mysticality are "twO aspects of the same fundamental quality, rather than two distinct characteristics."? The first aspect refers to the contents of the thought, that is, to the permeation of the physical with mystic powers incarnating the fear, hope, and religious awe of the primitive. The second aspect concerns connections between ideas, which because they implic:!te occult forces, operate independently of logic:!l l:!ws. The social and technological retardation of native peoples is wholly due to this inability to think physically and logically. Some such turn of mind is adamantly opposed to scientific thinking and technological orient:ltion; it is WeSlel'll DiscOllrses 011 Africa 3 only fi t to wallow in magic. thereby perpetuating the subordination of natives to mysterious forces. In the words of Levy-Bruhl, "the prelogical mind does not objectify nature thus. It filles it rather, by feeling itself participate in it, and feeling these participations everywhcre."s
The statement according to which colonialism portrayed Africans as an inferior race to justify the need for II tutor, however disparaging, was somewhat optimistic and condesccnd ing. Through prolonged tutorship, Africans could hopefully acqui re, though in a reduced version, the moral and intellectual virtues of the West. In refusing to derive the inferiority of colonized peoples from immaturity. Levy-Bruhl. ror his part, ascribes their backwardness directly to al terity. Their mind does not work like its Western counterpart; nor does it follow the same principles. The whole purpose of colonialism becomes problematic, since the possibility of closing the gap with the West, the so-called civili zing mission of colonialism. is thereby lost. The service that inferior races owe to the superior one is all thllt is left. The idea of other races being slaves by nature to the superior race could not have been better intimated.
What is quite llstoni shing is the existence of scholars-Africllll or Western opponents of colonial methods-who readily endorse the claims of the coloni zer. In the debate ovcr the existence of African philosophy. the term ethnophilosophy dcsignates the position of those African scholars who assent, directly or indircctly, to Ihc idea of African otherness. Because it provides "a revamped version of Levy-Bruhl's 'primitive mentality,'" ellinophi losophy is accused of being nothing less than a "secrel accompl ice" of colonial and ncocolonial designs. 9
Be it the idea of vital force as Ihc supreme o ntological principle of Bantu thinking, as expounded by Placide Tcmpels. or the predominance of emotion in the African thinking process, us upheld by LCopold SCdar Scnghor, the truth remains (hat these definitions of African mental attitudes do no more than bolster Levy-Bruhl's allegations. What is to say that for the Bantu force "is inseparable fro m thc definition of 'being'" if not 10 soak reality in a mystical ambicncc?IO In what sense does Senghor's statement that the European has toward the object "an objective intelligence." whereas the African Negro "feels it." differ from (he descriptions of Levy-Bruhl?) I In all these assertions, emotion lind occult forces do pervade the AfriClLn perception of reality to the point of obstructing thc rise of rational thinking.
The coming chapters will deal with thc real meaning of this apparent cndorsement of the colo nial discourse. In thc meantime. let us concentrate on thc task of exposing the considerable part of self-illusion infiating the belief in the exclusive rationality of the "white man. " For prior 10 the attempt of refuting what coloniali sm and anthropology said about Africa. we face the question of knowing whethcr the self-portrait of Europe is nOI itself an inven~ tion. The question sets the proper stage for revealing the strengths and side-
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slips of the cthnophilosophical discoursc. given the correlation between the Western definition of the "white man" and the African response, S. The Myth of thc "While Man"
Limiting again my investigations to Levy-Sruh!,s formulations, many instances show \hal we are dealing with an illusive idea of the Wes\. To begin with. his definitions abound with contradictions denOling now his hesitations, now his involvement in pure fantas ies. Already. the mge with wh ich thc idea of the distinction of the "white man" is pursued betnlYs so idiosyncratic a notion that it repels rationality by abjuring universality. Hardly is it possible to pin the label "rational" on an entity that so loudly cries for exclusivcness. Further. the theory of p rimiti~ve peoples frankly hesitates between linenr and divergent conccptions of evolution.
When Levy-Bruhl dismisses the identificillion of the primitive with a child. his conception seems to espouse the idea of different types of human beings. However. sometimes he reverts to a linear, stage-type of difference. Such is the case when. speaking of the perception o f reality. he says: "ours lthe Western perception1 has ceased to be so," that is. of bcing impregnated with mystic notions.
12 It cannot cense to be mystic unless it was once mystic. and this brings bnck the usunl evolutionary gap between the civilized nnd thc primitive. Likewise. the provision that without the collective representations. the primitive. taken as an individual , is quite ablc 10 behave rationally seems to conceive of primitiveness less ;IS a nutural state than liS an accumulated product of bad habits ilnd misguided thinking.
Though Levy-Bruhl exprcsses the need to forge new concepts to porI ray the primitive. he comes up with commonplace notions, such as, collective represcntations. mystic and prclogical thinking. Is not prelogical a stagcnotion, implying lateness. immaturity in lieu of ilherity? As 11 mailer of fact. l..cvy-Bruhl does not succeed in thinking the otherness of the primitive: his compafiltive method cannot but translate difference into superiority and inferiority. Beciluse the primitive is constantl y defined negatively. the purposc of the exercise is not so much objcctive apprehension as the elevation of the "white man" to the rank of the chosen race.
Where the part of invention becomes overwhelming is in the allempt 10 reduce, if not eliminate, the innuence of irrational. mystic thinking in the West. Consider, for instance. what Levy-Bruhl says about the place of dreams. Unlike civilized Europeans. primitives have full faith in dream. For them, far from being illusory. dream is even "a provision of the future." and so has "far greater significance than to us."!) The tendency to minimil.e the part of the irrational to decorate Ihe "white man" with the honors of rationality becomes obvious when we recall how lillie the affirmation is supported by facts. Whether we take the Bible. the foundation of European Christianity, Westem DiSCOllrses 011 Africa 5 or the ordinary belief of the Westerners. the role of dreams as revelation of profound truths is largely acceptcd.
Wh:lt. thcn. should we say when a thinker. such as Sigmund Freud. who is the product of Western rationality. pleads for the need to take dreams seriously? Interestingly. Freud notes. "the view of dreams which came nearest to thc truth was not the medical but the popular one. half involved though it still W:lS in superstition.,,14 So his purpose is not to question the relation of dreams to renlity: it is to wipe OUI the part of superstition by raisi ng the interpretation of dreams to the levcl of science. While this mny menn that dreams are not caused by demoniac and divine powers. still it preserves the important idca of drcams bcing revelations of deeper truths that are inaccessible to conscious lifc. Through his conviction that dreams are "disguised fu/flimellis of repre.\·sed wishes." Freud salvages much of the popular belief of the Wcst. which is similar to tlwt of "the pri mitive."ls In addition to refuti ng the assertion that the "white man" docs not give credit to dreams. the position of Frcud suggests thm the allribution of grcuter significance to dreams, llnd not its dismissal. is rat ionally justified. In light of rationality turning out to be the accepllLnce of irrationality. L6vy-Bruhl's :lltempt to lesscn thc place of dreams in thc "white mun's" thinking appears <IS an overstatement of ra tionali ty th<lt is backfi ring. Bluise Pascal wllrns: "he who would play the Hngel plays the beast.,, 16 We can call upon thc crilical views of Karl Marx as well HS those of Friedrich Nietzsche to strengthen the idca that rationality -begins wit h the lIcccptancc of irr:Ltionality. The merit of both philosophers is to havc exposcd how much of the history of the West is the story of irrational bcliefs putting on the mask of rationality. Take thc history of philosophy itsel f: docs it not rel;lIe the man ner occult beliefs are p:lradcd ;lS ralional statements. as exemplified by the rationalization of religious bel iefs in all ideali:;t philosophy? To brag about being rational on top of being unable to recognize the inilial irrationality of Western thi nking constitutes a double failurc that throws thc thinking far uway from ration ality. Genuine nllionality begins with the recognition of irrationality. nOI its denial. This genuincness is thcn understood as a conqucst obtaincd by the development of a critical rclationship wi th oneself. The main condition 10 achieve such a critical view is the surrender of all selfnatlcring images, a condition thllt Levy-Bruhl hard ly meets.
Si milarly. thc emphatic affirmation that primitivcs do not obey the principle of non-contradiction does not pay 1I11cntion to the controversies generated by the same principle in the history of Wcstcrn philosophy. Just as lll;lIlY ph ilosophcrs considered the principlc of non-contradiction as a sacrosanctlaw of correct thinki ng, so too philosophers who disclosc its limitations. somc goi ng so far as 10 suggest the creation of another logic. arc not hard to find. A case in point is Hcracl itus. who is famous for dcfcnding the unity and struggle of opposites. sllying. for instance, that "the path up and down is one • ,lt1d the sa me." or "as the same thing there exists in us Ii ving and dead and the waking and the sleeping and young and old: for these things having changed round arc those, and those having changed round arc t.hese."!? Closer to our times, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the Marxists contrast metaphysics with dialectics, which they credit with superior intelligence and consider as the apex of Western thinking. Unlike metaphysics which, to quote Friedrich Engels, declares that "n thing either exists. or it does not exist." or that "it is equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else," dialectics holds: motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only corne about through 11 body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the sHIne place and also not in il.
18
Granted that those called "primitives" did not have the same understanding when they were transgressing the law of non-contradiction, nonetheless under pai n of relegating much of Western philosophical breakthroughs to primitive thinking, the apparent flexibility of "primitives" about contradictions should not be called prclogica1.
The mere neglect of the various facets of Western thi nki ng is not the only issue. The strong impregnation of idealist concepts with mystic notions can be established without endorsing the Marxist critique of idealism. For example, what else is at work but a mystic thinking when PlnlO speaks of the objective existe nce of a world of ideas? In general. the constant references of idealist philosophers to the role of God and the autonomy of the spi ritual together with the usc of such notions as the "noumcnal world," "the vital impetus." the transcendence of "the idea," show to what extent Western philosophy is fraught with mystic notions. to say nothi ng of the truth contnined in the accusation that much of Western philosophical energy originates from the necessity of rescuing Christian mysticism and ideals from the attacks of science.
The reality about the West is not so much rationality versus irrationality as the coex istence and interaction of the two. May it not be, then, that in the primitive mentality too the two coexist, maybe with the difference that the dominion of irralionality is greater over the "primitivc" than the~"civilizcd." At any rate, the denial of irrationality. the stubborn Cllre to reserve rmionality for the West and irrationality for the rest of humankind, authorizes us to speak of the invention of the "whi te man." What is more. the more obstinate the denial. the higher is the irrationality of the classification.
So great is the blinding power of the alleged Western spccialness that it prevents LCvy~BflIhl from asking simple though essential questions. If primitive peoples arc so completely shrouded in mystic notions that they ignore the laws of logic and causality, the crucial question becomes that of knowing how they manage to survive in so inhospitable a natural environment. From the descriptions of primitives, what we gather is Iheir tolal powerlessness vis-avis nature, given their failure 10 take into consideration its most elementary laws. Had this been true, they would have been wiped off the face of the earth long ago. Levy-Bruhl cannot recognize this fuct because it objects to the myth of the unique rationality of the West.
This survival is exactly what Henri Bergson undc rlines in his refutation of Levy-Bruhl's thesis. Without the confidence in the invariability of natural laws, the primitive, according to Bergson, "would not rely on the current of the river to carry his canoe, nor on the bending of his bow to shool his arrow, on his hatchet to cut into the trunk, on his teeth to bite, on his legs to walk.,,19 In all the Cllses discussed by Levy-Bruhl. none really stipulates the indifference of the primitive to causal laws. Instcad, occu lt causes arc supervenient phenomena: they intervene to explain, not the physiclll effect as such, but "ils hllman significance . .. its importance to man. and more especially to a particular man.,,20 Bergson concludes: "there is nothing illogical, consequelllly nothing 'prelogicaJ' or even anything which evi nces an 'imperviousness to experience. ",21 Better still, he asks us to take note of the "striking ... resemblance between the mentality of the civilized and of the primitive man when dealing with facts such as those ... loCi deuth, illness, serious accident. '.z2 Nowhere in the world ha.~ magic ever been a substitute for causllJity. In reality, concerning things that are with in their mechanicaL reach, human beings rely on mechanical laws to obtain or counter material effects. As these effects de pend also on wider material connections that are outside their control. they te nd 10 evoke occult forces whose significance is to humanize nature. To be susceptible to human solicitations and intluenced by rituals, reality " must appear animated with a purpose"m The fu nction of spiritual entities is this provision of reali ty with purpose. As scientific knowledge progresses, the mcchliniclil c ircle grows to the detriment of the magical one, without however dis placing it entirely. In short, as an expression of the natural. irrationality remains the forced companion of rationality. Levy-Bruhl's allempt to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between the rational and the irrational comes under the heading less of objective study than of self-deceiving thi nking. Apurt fro m being a falsifica tion of reality, the rejection of irrationality particularizes and isolates "the white man" fro m the rest of humankind. So exclusive a rational attribute shakes off universal ity, and contains its refutation.
C. Anthropology: Myth and Reality
Nietzsche's critical study of Western idealism shows how an ideal world is constructed and projected onto the real world. The result of this projection is 8 AFRICA'S QUEST FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF D£COLONIZATION the depreciation of the real world: termed "uppearancc" as opposed to truth. the visible world becomes the realm of change and deceit while the ideul world is described us eternal and perfecl. Nietzsche find s that moral ideals pro vide the ultimme justification for the separation and opposition of the twO worlds. Behind the construct ion of the idcnl world as unchanging, immaterial. lUld perfect is a moml aspIration of an ascetie type that takes delight in declining sensuous life. What knowledge portrays as the opposition of truth to falsity, of essence to appearance is, thercfore, the aspiration for a morality hooked on an ascetic ideal. The visible being untrue, th e good cannot reside in the senses. The purpose of metaphysics, and by cx tens ion of its main product. the concept of rcason, is to refute the reality posited by the human body. Nietzsche recapitul;Ltes the thinking of the metaphysicia ns thus:
The senses, which ;11 oilIer Ihillgs are so immoral, cheat us concerning the true world. Moral: we must gel rid of the deeeption of thc senses. of Becoming. of history, of falsehood.
And above all . away with the body, this wretched ideeflxe of the senses. infected with all the f;lUlI s of logic that exist , refuted. even impossible. although it be impudent enough to pose as if it were real!24
Levy-Bruhl 's analyses are all impregnated with the same type of evaluation. Primitives arc peoples dominated by passions: lheir body occupies the cenlml place in their thinking to the extent of stifling ration;11 thinking. Reason has not yet established its power over the body so that emotion dominates even in operations that are supposedly intellectual. According to Westem canons of evaluati on, this preponderance of the body denotes a lower rank in the hierarchy of being. To call primiti ves prelogical is the same thing as sayi ng that they arc sensuous. Their inability to cont rol sensuousness explains their failure at dissociating the intellectual from the e motional. The superiority of Ihe " white man" is thus supposedly first and foremost moral. Instead of being a question of more or less. such moral superiority invol ves the quality of thc mind.
In thus harnessing LCvy-Bruhrs position to the mainstream of idealist thinking. we secure the means to solve the riddle of anthropology. When African scholarS criticize anthropological discourse, more often than not they consider it as a deliberately falsified discourse intent on justifying colonialism. For Pau lin J. Hounlondji. anthropology is a "pscudo_science.,,2s For V. Y. Mudimbe. anthropological statements "speak about neither Africa nor Africans, but rather justify the process of inventing a nd conqueri ng a continent.,,2(, The notioll or invention brings OUI the confounding dichotomy between the claims of anthropology as n science and its unsubstant iated findings. So fixed a dichotomy is bound to raise numerous questions.
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The dichotomy does not. for instance. explain why European thinking could be so lured as to give credibi lity to a fi cti tious discourse. The question is legitimate as African scholars borrow much of their critical weapons against anthropology from Western scholars. Marx. Freud. Nietzsche. and the various schools of structurali sm are knowll to provide the critical apparatus. This raises the question of knowing how the same Western culture could at once produce the imaginary discourse on Africa and the critical concepts exposing its fa llacies. More genera ll y, seeing that the same culture produced both anthropology and the sc ientific method with its tested objecti ve results. undcr pain of losing a coherent view of the human mind. we must show how anthropology fits into the scientific practice.
To resolve the problem, the first cond ition is to cease contrast ing science with myth. lust as meiliphysics inspired ra tionality and science, so too the myth of the "while man" can set off a scientific practice intent on vulidming its belief. This suggests that the same process of construction and objectification is active in the scienti fic study of nature as well as of human societies and cultures. However, while natural objects passively conform, in the Kantian sense of the word. to the process of objectificalion, human bei ngs clln protest against objectification, thereby nullifying its proced ure and outcomes. Through such protest, human beings invent themselves anew so thM transcendence defines them better than the possession of fixed characterist ics .
Jean-Paul Sartre ga ve a striking formula for this transcendence when he said that in the case of human beings "existence precedes essence:,27 Unrortunately. more often than not people let themselves l5e defined externall y; in such cases, they surrender Iheir frecdom and give in to submission. For the purpose of objectification is to bring the object under controL which when applied to human beings amounts to the negation of subjecti vity. Even so. subjecti vity does not go away . Sartre judiciously remarks, "ir I do not choose, I am still c hoosing" by refusing to choose. 28
The ineluctability of choice sets the purpOse of Levy-Bruhl's dichotomy: it elevates the white race above the other races and calls for a hierarchical combi nation, the very one that justifies the ascendancy of the logical ovcr the prelogical. That is why going bcyond mere differcnce, his definition estublishes a contrast between the primitive and the "white man." Such a binary opposi tion invites an articulution in which the hegemony of the logicnl race supplements the deficiencies of the primitive. AccQrding to most theories. economic reasons explain in the last instance the colonial conquest of Africa. Far from me to deny the importance of econo mic drive, slill some theories suggest that Europe could huve obtained higher economic relums if it hltd avoided the cumbersome and inhuman prHcticc of political and cultural subjugmion and opted for the development of the cominent through free economic exchanges. The soundness of the <trgument indicates how feasible the idea was. But. the theory of colo nialism retorts, the rivalry between the major European powers obstructed the option for free economic relations with AFric,,: the protection of economic interests favored the possession of colonies. No sooner is this argument accepted than it goes counter to the principles of liberalism. When. in the name of the free market. some people praise Europe for having destroyed all internal ban-iers, strange is the way they say simultancously that Europe had encouraged colonization.
To avoid the contrad1ct.ion, theoreticians of colonialism must concede that the "white man" is a myth. an invention. and as such in need of substantiation. The trend toward colonial conquest and anthropological discourse thus crops up from the core of the myth. One thing cannot be taken away from the myth, 10 wit, its compulsion to look for validation. So that, the justi!ication for subjugating non-Western peoples instcad of engaging in free economic exchanges emanates from the perceived otherness of these peoples, which otherness justifies the hegemonic position of the West. The myth of the "white man" calls for the atlfibution of otherness to non-Western peoples, and subjugation constitutes its validation following the scientific criterion of successful practice as a con!irmalioll of truth. While anthropology establishes the otherness of non-Western peoples, conquest confirms materially the superiority of the "white man."
To understand the possibility of this inversion of myth into rationality, we must brush aside the idea of a del iberate falsification of reality. The concept of ideology, of false consciousness, as conceptualized by Marx and Engels. is liable to bring clarification inlO the maHcr. Accord ing to Engels: ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a fa lse consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process?9
Ideology is then an internal deception unnoticed by the author. It is no lie because individuals who lie know they are lying. Ideology is not a mere fantasy either, since it has connections with reality. The illusion is not about the object; it is !irst of all in the consciousness thinking the object. This consciousness has illusions about itself, about its motives and nature. As a result, what such a consciousness docs materially does not coincide with its thinking. The thinking interprets practice differently, more eX<J,ctly, ideally. Thus, it vei ls economic pursu its with lofty ideals, and private property bccomes a natural right, the slate of the ruling class the defender of the gcneral interest, and colonialism a civilizing mission.
This concealment was apparently the state of mind of Europe when il undertook the conquest and study of native peoples. The myth of "the white man" invents otherness "s the lower rank of human esscnce while anthropological studies and colonialism provide the concrete practices of its confirma-tion. This false consciousness explains both the sinccrity of the belief in the superiority of the white race and the possibility of an objectification of Africa. After all , the achievement of objective results in the pursuit of mythical ideas is not infrequent. The development of rational thinking in an atmosphere heavily loaded with idealism is the very history of Europe. The ideality of the fal se consciousness explains the binh of an objectivist and conquering practice. Thus, through the dualistic conception of mind and bodY--<lIl idca that goes back 10 Christian beliefs-Rene Descanes fostered the necessary detachment enabling him to grasp matter as a mechanical reality.
This idealist inspi ration of Western philosophy highlights the main purpose of my approach, which is to cxhort Africans to reconcile themselves wi th mythical thinking if thcy mcan to play any meaningful role in the world. W. E. B. Du Bois wrote: "no people that laughs at itself, and ridicules itself. and wishes to God it Wil S anythi ng but itself ever wrote its name in history.,,30
The realization that the so-called European excl usive T<lIion:tl ity is more an invention than a distinct chaT;tcteristic should liberate Africans from the need to define themselves in terms acceptable to the "white man."
African critique of anthropology boi ls down to a denial of its descriptions of Africans on account of nonconformity with the critcria set by the "white man." As a result, the illusion of the "white man" is reproduced; worse, Africa is suppressing all its driving impulses just to conform to an idea of humanity whose censorship of irrational d ri ves is anything but true. The characteristics of the "white man," such as, wholl y Tlll ionai. ascetic, and conquering, become models of behavior that Africans must iinilale by surrendering their right to freely defi ne themselves. Some such exhortlltion trn nspires in Hountondji when, refusing the notion of African alterity, he asks fo r the inauguration of philosophical systems which are AfriCllll only by "the geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of COlltenL,,31 Is it surprising if, as a result of this ideological emasculation. Africa becomes unable to cope with the modern world?
Take the critique of elhnophilosophy by those African philosophers called "professional philosophers." Whether they refer to Tempcls's attribution of the notion of vital force to Africans, or John Mbiti's exclusion of the fu ture from the African notion of timc. or Senghor's view on the predominance of emotio n in African thinking, none of these thinkers escapes the charge of endorsement of colonial discourse. Instead of inciti ng further research, the slightest suggestion of African difference arouses indignation. Yet such should not have been the reaction of African scholars. given their propensity to liken the idea of the "white man" to a false inwge. Whatever the idea may otherwise signi fy. for Sllrc it cannot be used to defi ne the hu nHlIll1eSS of Africans. In return, Africans should have suspected that what the "white man" despises probably contai ns a grain of truth fo r everybody else. Once the idea of the ';white man" is taken seriously as an invention, u wide possibi lity of defining themselves in a creative way opens to Africans. As we shall see, despite its numerous shortcomings. negritude was the first attempt to bend the anthropological discourse in the direction of self-creation.
Western Attempts to Make Sense of Africa
LCvy-Bruhl's assimilation of primitive mentality to a prelogieal form of thought was bound to generate objections in Western ac'ldemic circles. Though few in number, these objections represented remarkable efforts to intersperse the triumphant march of Eurocentrism with a pluralist notion of human beings. A clear demarcation of these efforts from the evolutionist trend of thought helps to bring out the remarkable influence that these Western scholars had on African thinkers in their responses to the colonial discourse.
A. Demystifying Reason
No sooner had the Western triumplulllt and confident march tow.lrd progress recorded its first impressive victories than doubts were heard as to the intrinsic val idity of the whole project. The two notions on which the Enlighte nment had build its philosophy of history. to wit. the idea of reason and the progressive march toward freedom, which stood for the unquestionable superiority of the Western model of life, were never enti rely successful in dismissing doubts and interrogations. A most memorable moment of this skepticism is the dissenting position of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the notion of progress. To the question in 1750 by the French Academy of Dijon of whether the restoration of the sciences and the arts had served to purify or corrupt manners and mor.tls. Rousseau flatly responds in a notorious discourse: "our souls have become corrupted in proportion as our Sciences and our Arts hHve advanced toward perfection. ',32 Rousseau defends his objection against the belief in progress by a comparative study of modern life with the life of those called primitives whose noticeable trait is their apparent indifference to the ideal of science and the refinement of civili zation. While these peoples, '·protected against this contami nation of vuin knowledge, have by their vinues wrought their own happiness and the model for all other Nations." modem civilization merely muhiplies and expands the vices of greed, luxury. and inequality.Jl Consequently. the modern human being is completel y unhappy. The submcrsion of human life in ever-increasing vices simply annuls the benefits of technological advances. The proliferntion of vices and the engulfment in an anificial and frenzied style of life give evidence of estrangement from the right path to human fulfillment.
Rousseau' s defense of the primitive peoples rests on the assumption that nature created human beings good so that the closer human societ ies remain Western DiscOIlrses 011 Africa 13 to nature the beller their chance is of fulfilling thc end of human life. Hence Ihe need of the modern person 10 fall back on the primitivc peoples to understand the real aspirations of human nature. Lei alone being a retarded race, primitive peoples represent the prototype of Ihe human essence. the pure form before Ihc deformation imparted by Ihe so-c;Llled civilization. Rousseau insists: "it was not owing 10 stupidity that they [simple peoples] preferred other forms of exercise to those of the mind.").l
The claim that native peoples arc good because Ihey are ignorant or innoccnt, as children are, docs not see their goodness as a positive and deliberate choice. The truth is that whi le modern human beings opted for the artificial life called civilization. thereby biding farewell to the udvantages of natural life, wiser peoples have preferred to stay close to nature. which harbors Ihe secrets of human happiness. Their goodness is not due to Iheir undeveloped nature, hut to the positive understanding that since "man is naturally good:' the best mode of life is the one that follows nature.
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Anticipating the dismissal by some contemporary amhropologists of the Western discourse as a tissue of inventions whose purpose is to marginalize non-Western peoples. Rousseau reiterales his suspicions about the credibi lity of the description of primitive peoples given by Western travelers. In one of his replies 10 objections. he characterizes these travelers as "more interested in Iilling their purses than their heads." and adds Ihat "all of Afri ca and its numerous inhabitants. as remarkable in character as they are in color. still remain 10 be studied: the whole earth is covered with Nations of which we know only the namcs. and yet we pretend to judge mankind!,,;l6 Contrast this appeal to Siudy other peoples :md learn from them with the Eurocentric arrogance of Hegelianism and evolutionism. By insisting that Ihe alleged superiority of the West only hides moral degradation and a wandering course. Rousseau imputes the major omission of human happiness to the whole Weslern civil ization.
With deep roots in Rousseau's thinking. the other tradition of Western phi losophy that challenged the haughtiness of the West is the spiritual movement known as romanticism. One facet of this complex movement believes that I mmanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason correctly establishes the limits of rational knowledge while corroborating the existence of a true reality beyond the phenomenal world. The main upshot of this limitation is that rational knowledge is only a superficial. external view of the world, exclusively driven by the need to manipulate objects from outside. However, though Kant is right in saying Ihal the decper reality of things escapes reason, he forgets that human beings have other possibilities as well. for instance, sentiments and intuition. The latter seem perfectly equipped to penetrate the deeper reality of Ihe noumenal world better than the facul ty of reason. Thus, for Arthur Schopenhauer, unlike the superficial view of perception and reason in which the world appears as discontinued collections of separate objects, intuition grasps the world as will. and so views objects as integrated and coordi nated sources of activity.
The best illustration of this will is our body. As an object of re presentation, Ollr body appears as a thing existing in various spatio-temporal relations with other objects. As apprehended from within. we feel it as will. "This will constitutes what is most immediate in hi s [the indi vidual1 consciousness. but as such it has not wholl y entered into the fo rm of the representation, in which object and subject stand over against each other," says Schopenhauer?7 This immediateness involves a different faculty than the intellect, and is properly called intuition . The revelation of the power of intuition protests in advance against the hierarchy established by Levy-Bruhl: rational thinking is not the highest mental ability; intuition or feeling obtains a deeper view of reality, especi all y of spiritual realities. Thi s role of fee li ng endows art with a greater cogniti ve dimension than science and speculation.
The romantic inspiration has continued through various forms in the West right up to the twentieth century. A case in point is Bergson' s philosophical stand in favor of the irreplaceable role of intuition. which alone can go beyond the limitations of rational knowledge. After a series of systematic contrasts, Bergson find s that "the imellect is characterized by a n{/fllral i"ability to cOlllprehend life." whi le "it is to the very inwardness of life that ;IItliitioll leads us."J8 Another important trend is the existe nti(Llist protest agai nst the dominance of rational thinking. From S0ren Kierkegaard to Sartre. the protest insists on the extent to which reason has little (0 say concerning the important questions related to the meaning of life.
To limit the protest to Kierkcgaard, he notes that the ideal of objecti ve knowledge excludes. by definition, the subject; nOlle of the terms used to describe the world objectively answers the deep concerns of the subject. Hence the imperative to become subjecti ve: it counters the tendency of objectivism to turn the truth into an object. In this wuy, meaning returns to truth, since "for a subjective reflection the truth becomes a m<ll\cr of lIppropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity.,,19
The existentialist drift into subjectivism was spurred on by the spectacle of the civili zed world being dragged into the insanity of twO successive and most destructive world wars. with at its peak the ri se of fascistic theories and regimes. [n light of the butchery of these modern wars, the naive belief in progress became indefensible; nay. the harrowing question of knowing whether Western civilization is really representing an ascending and progres~ sive course came into sight. This doubt persuaded many scholars into challenging the characterization of non-Western peoples as inferior and arrested peoples.
Both the rise of the romantic inspiration and the mul tiplication of prOlests suggest Ihat the issue of rationality versus non-rationality is a debate internal to the West itselr. The diverse outcries agai nst an excessive rationalist trend suppressing the role of sentiments and intuition together with the aHempt to rehllbilitate the so-call ed primitive peoples attest to the internality of the debate. The dispute has to do with the place of reason and. by extension, of science in the complex issue of c ivilization and human fundamental aspirations, That Western trcnds of thought rose against the dominance of reason plellds for a nuanced reception of the identification of the West with rationality.
B. The Discovery of Western Idi osy ncrasy
Predictably. the thinkers who judged the trend of Westcrn civi lization as far from being satisfactory were warming to the idea of other civi lizations as alternatives. The notion of a Western breakthrough waS not for them a convincing idea, for they noted progress in some directions but also regress and loss in other equally important aspects of life. So released from the belief in the civil izing mission of the Wesl lO which most Westerners were lIt1ached. they came 10 conceive of ethnology as a spiritual voyage, an acquaintance with the diversity of human nature, and a discovery of new and nlternative modes of life. As one author explains, "disslltisfied at home and questing abroad:' the anthropologist "is a scout sent out by a civi lization in turmoil to find a resti ng place and learn the IllY of the land.".w Implicit in this quest for thc primitive is the belief that wbat in the West passes for universal is o nly an idiosyncratic development. After the :lfrogant glorificat ion of Eurocentrism, comes the time of critical evaluation and radicalism. No school of thought inc:mlates better this critical project than postmodernism, given that "the most general characterization of postmodern ism is that its emphasis is on call ing inlO question the foundational concepts at the heart of Western ph ilosophy.,,41 For many scholars, the origin of post illodernism lies in "the profound innuence of Nietzsche and Heidcgger on contemporary Western inte llectuallife.,,4l This influence grows stronger as many Western intellectual s become increasingly disenchanted with socialism and Marx 's ideas of socialist revolulion without. however, recovering any attachment to capitalism. Postmoderni sm essentially renects the "sociopolitical pessimism" ste mming from the clellr impression of a civi li zation caught in a deadlock.4l In addit ion to undermining the confidence of the West, the conviction encourages the belief that Euroccntrism offers no other outlets than the frenzy of capi tlilist pursuits. In light of this disillusionment. the trend of thought so far followed has to be altered: abnormality shirts from other cu ltures to that of the West and it becomes "increasingly tempting to contrast the West as a whole with the rest of the world as a whole.,,-t4
Such repeated references of Marti n Heidegger to "the end of philosophy" and to the primacy of "questioning." together with his recurring aJlu-sions to "the oblivion of Being" lll1d his diagnosis of the West as having "exhnusted its possibilities," dcscribe a situation of deep crisis that reuchcs a stalematc, Instead of extolli ng Europe's lldvanccd stage-behind which the rest of the world is lugging-the diagnosis depicts an abnormal trend, which. on top of being singular, forces the rest of the world into a futureless process, The Western deadlock entails the rehabilitation of Africa by stripping the West of its pretension to be a model. No need for Africuns to enguge in the defense of Africa: the West is pleading guilty und the disparugement of Africa is only a misrepresentation of its phantasms.
Heidegger corroborates the idiosyncrasy of the West by a sustained analysis of its mode thinking. For him, the essencc of the West lies in its particular way of thinking being, which explains its uncommon technological leaning. As Richard Rorty elucidates. this particular W<1y flows from the separation betwecil the "what" and the "that." This separation between what a thing is in itself und the relations which it has to other things engenders distinctions between essence and accident. reality and appellrance. objective and subjective, rational and irrational. scientific and unscientific and the like-all the dualisms which mark off epochs in the history of an increasing lust for power. an increased inability to let beings be.
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These dualisms inaugurate the age of the world picture. an age in which Westerners entirely surrender all other possible relationships with being cxcept the one targeting power and conquest. This pathological lust for power and domination defincs the essence of Western idiosyncrasy. As such, the lust invalidates the promotion of the West to the rank of the most advanced stage. just as it rejects thc idea of a unilincar process of universal evolution. That thc goal. the miSOI1 d'elre of humanity is the conquest of nature Cll11 never be provcn. Other cultures define humanity'S rclationships with nature in different terms. and their definition is no less valid than the gOeLl of conquest. The definition is evcn wiser. given the Western impasse.
Spccifically, what cxplains the shift in the West of the question of ontology from the fact of being to that of a picture or a representation is none other than the precedcnce of the preconceived idca or project to the bllre reulity of being. In thc words of Heideggcr. world picture does not mean u picturc of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is. in its entirely . is now takcn in such a wuy that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent it is sel up by man. who rcpresents and sets forth.
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Even the approach most committed to studying things objcctivcly. namely, the sciemific approach, implicates this kind of projection. Contrary to the received ide:L describing scientific experiment as the process of learning from nature, Hcidcgger shows that the particularity and power of modern science dcrive from studying nature through a projccted plan. The whole purpose of an experiment is to see the extent to which facts of nature either verify or deny the preconceived idea. Th is precedence of the plan in the Western dealings with nature demands thc reversal of the historical ordcr. Though modern technology is admittcdly a product of modern scicnce on the grounds that science chronologically preceded the production and use of machines. from the viewpoint of imparting the inspiration. modern technology is "historically earlier" to science.
47 How olherwise could we understand the primuey of the world picture over the fact of being if not as evidence of nature being interpreted through a preconceived project. the very one handing it over to a Promelhenn inspiration?
Whut is wrong. we may ask. with this desire for empowerment? According to Heidegger. its major druwbuck is that the way being is conceived impacts on the manner human beings understlLlld themselves. The desire 10 conquer nature enlUils the conception of humULl beings as a subjectivity whose consequence is that everything iLppcars ns a human construct. The revel:llion lit the heart of knowledge of a preconceived plan turns lIlJ human conceptions into subjective views with no bearing on reality and truth. Such is the adversity of the lust for dominalion that "it seems as though 1111111 1 h · If--48 • everywhere and always encounters on y Lmse .
To admit that the price for domination is the rcJativization of knowledge is to open our thought to the idell thut other ways of relating with the world exist as weJl ilS to acknowledge the different choices that sustain thcm. Though these other wlLyS may not be as efficient in providing control over nuture lL S the Western orientlltion. they muy reveal ways of being and thinking that drag human beings oul of their narrow subjectivity. For instance. unlike the conqueri ng model , poetry suggests a different mO<le of revealing being: by lelling things be, it discovers und glorifies their inner beauty. und so incites the mind to tr.mscend the mere desire to control and dominate. This incitement to transcend subjectivism reconverts the humlln essence from "the lord of beings" to "the shepherd of Being., , 49 This Heideggerian analysis draws much of its inspi ration from Nietzsche's anatomy of the Western mental orientation. What makes Nietzsche'S insights pa rticularly original and illu minating is the demonstration of the extent to which the lust for dominntion engulfs the human person as well. Western ethical and religious ideas are so many wllys of establishing within the human person the antinomy of domirmtion and servitude. The dualisms of mind and body, plelL sure and duty. naturc and culture. good ,md evil. are nothing but the manner onc aspect of the human person, considered superior. noble, and good, is set against another pan, considered inferior, low, unct evil. In this uninterrupted connict between the twO components of the same person. ethical life is how the superior pan maintains its dominance over the lower pun. The opposition of true being (soul, spirit) to fulse Of apparent being (thc body). characteristic of the metaphysical form of thinking, authorizes this modc of evaluation. Thus metaphysicians say:
things of the highest value must have a different origi n. an origin of their own-in this transitory, seductive, illusory. paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory. in the concealed God, in the 'Thi ng-initselr-there must be their source, and nowhere else!-so
The goal of dominance has brought about the admiration of the warrior, but even more so the veneration of the priest. With his resohllion 10 achieve a complete victory over sensuous life, the priest represents the highest model of mastery, the greatest demonstration of the power of the immaterilll and the abstrnct over the mllterial and the sensuous. What is vellentted through the priest is the highest value of the West. to wit, the "ascetic ideal.,,51 Because asceticism combines metaphysics and morality, it is the consummation of the victory over false being and sensuousness. No belief way exists to denounce ralsity than to say no to life even as it promises pleasure. The secret of this denial is nonc other than the achievement of a greater sense of power through the generation of an in ner conflict that unleashes, in the words of Nietzsche, "the resentment of an insatiate instinct and ambition, that would be master, not over some element in life, but over life itselr.,,52
C. Post modernist Inferences
The understanding of Western culture as a particular and aggressive drive reiterates the eccentricity of Western mental orientation and mode of life. In particular, if. as emphasized by both Nietzsche and Heidegger, what passes for reason and universality is a product of an idiosyncratic inspiration, the conclusion that knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is an objective apprehension of things call no longer be made. This lack of objectivity is not caused by a faulty usage of the mind: it is due to the fu ndamental fact that all knowledge is 11 construction. that the so-called objective reality is ;l made up, subjectIve product. Alluding to the deconstruction theory, Michael Paul Gallagher writes:
all reality is like a text. open to a myriad of connicting interpretations. Instead of the "modern" assu mption that objectively correct answers are possible, we lire all caught in a "prison house of language," where rela-tivism replaces any rationally ordered world. MClming, if it exists at all, is created by us and is always in nux.~3
If a material fact implicates construct ion. then how much more so may it be with social and cultural realities. Such a deep-going relativism of concepts and views spares nothing; it even chalJenges the entrenched bel ief in personal identity. In place of the humanism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, both based on the centrality of human beings and on the permanence of individual identity as source of human freedom, " post modernism proposes the 'death of man ', in the sense of a radical scep ticism about subjective approaches and about the imponance given to personality and self-consciousness in Western culture."S4
Once personal identity as a defining fcature of individuals is challenged, the very foundmion of Western religious and ethical ideas as well as political systems is seriously shaken. The challenge is grealer to the foundationa l beliefs of modernity. Notably, the universal and progressive course of history by which the Enlightenment had justified and popularized the view of human history as a goal-oriented process implicating distinct stages of realization becomes an untenable belief. Branded universal, these stages were believed to denote the transition from the simple and inferior state of human freedom and knowledge 10 complex and superior moments of rcalization. This gradua l scheme led to the supposition that Europe represellls the highest stage of this evolution with the consequence that European history reveals the course that lagging societies must follow to resume the progressive course of history. Stated otherwise, Third World cultures arc false ly identified as moving along the same historical evolutionary path as the West. propelled by the same cultur<ll ideals and the same dynamic forces. Both tile liberal and Marxist systems subsume Third World cultural processes under universalist theories of evolution that do not apply uni versally .~~
The reduction of concepts to constructs seriously undermines this scenario by suggesting that the vision of a universal and uniJinear evolutionary course is nothing else than the fraudulent manner Europe so constructs its continuity as 10 assume the excl usive leadership of the historical process. Otherwise known as Eurocentrism, the true essence of this vision is usurpation. which usurpation is caused by the phmllasrns of <I cu lture greedy for selfglorification and conquests.
The denunciation of Eurocentrism entails the untenabi lity of the concepts used to describe non-Western societies. As noted by D. A. Mnsolo, "the historical merit of the post modernist critique arises out of its questioning of the validity of taking the Western model of rationaljty as the yardstick for judging others,"S(, Sueh expressions as primitive. backwurd .• lI1d traditional express the fuct of other cultures being forcefully taken in tow by the Western path . ,\rbitrarily elevated to the rank of advanced model. Besides decentering othcr cultures. the towing has the characteristic effect of misconstruing their undcrstanding, In light of relativism urging us to speak of "Western categories:' "Western eIJisleme:' and "Western principles:' other cultures emerge "as 'creations' or representations of Western social science, .. s7
Because these representations take the West as thc model. a major consequence of this usurpation is thut "the traditional approuehes in Western philosoEhy sysiemmiclllly exclude and marginalize some stories and experiences," ~ The nct result of erccting a model can only be the 1ll'lrginalizlltioll of other cultures, thcir depiction as inferior ,lI1d lagging cultures, Thc promotion is a malicious construct in thm it authorizes the characterization of nonWestern peoples as primitl,ve and savage by placing Europe al the center of everything,
From the marginalization of non-Western culturcs, there emerges the justification of domestication. the civiliz.ing mission of the West. This domestication promises the progressive removal of the accumulated obstacles to progress through the assimilation of Western methods and values, Be it noted that the project docs no more than revive the premises of Western episteme and ethical principles, Just as Ihe separation of essence and appearance in knowledge prepares the dethronement of the 'Ipparent being. so toO Westernization replaces the false -'man" of native cu ltures with the real --man" as revealed in the West. The openllion is how the spiritual principles and rational norms of the West endeavor to lake control of ,I life engulfed in scnsuousness. magic, and emotion as a result of failing to emancipate itself markedly from nature and instinctive behaviors.
The highly ,Iulo-critical impact of postlllodernism achieves more than the disgrace of colonialism Ihrough the denunciation of its phantasms; it also moves toward the rehllbilitation of the m'lrginalized cultures, Once the universality of the Western trend is contested. the way is wide open to understandi ng other cultures as legitimate and equally valid alternative forms of life. According to Rorty. once more Heidegger shows the way by suggesting thai "the opposite of metaphysics is Openness to Being. something most e,lsily achieved in a pretechnological peasant community with unchanging cusloms,"SQ The paradox is thm PQstmoderniS11l becomes a backward movemenlthat calls for the reevaluation of traditional societies: Ihe disillusionment with the West entai ls a de facto rehabilitation of other cultures. Instead of being backward, these cultures represent different modes of life. other ways of connecting with Being, In misreading and colonizing these cultures. the West was obeying its impUlsive urge to make things conformable to its representations. This urge should not come as a surpri sc: the West could not lei these cultures be. any more than it lei things be, All these critical views on Wcstern modcrnity convcrge on the major discovery of postmodernisll1, to wit, pluralism. By denouncing Westcrn universalism and the subsequc11l imposition of sameness, "postmooernism has rediscovered 'difference' as a key value and relishes in the seeming anarchy of cultural diversity.,,60 The radical nature of the post modernist discovery ll1Ust be clearly stated. Especiall y, we must disti nguish the discovery from the type of pluralism that refrains from c haracterizing other cultures as false or backward while consideri ng them as largely commensurate. Because this mitigated pluralism still harbors universalist creeds, it takes differences as sUperficial deviations ngainst the background of deeper similarities.
Radically different is post modernism: it takes other culturcs as valid alternatives to the Western course. Thus, Ruth Benedict spoke of cultures as being "incommensurable," for "they arc traveling along different roads in pursuit of different ends,',61 The rehabilitation of other cultures is thus total. without any restriction, fo r no culture has a universal st:l1 US. The commitment to radical relativism implies that all cultures arc views taken from different perspectives, and not from different spots or moments of the same line of evolution. As such. they arc incommensurable. Post modernism denounces all forms of reductionism as well as all forms of ra nking. The ranking of cultures becomes impossible once the unilinear and evolutionary scheme is rebuffed. When the basis fo r the defense of Western superiority is rcmoved, a pluralistic view of history fo rces its way. This pluralistic view of history suys that thi rd world countrics werc follow ing their own course untilthcy were brutally interrupted by thc West and taken in tow. May it not bc. then, that thc explanation for the grent difficultics that these countries face in copi ng with modernity lies in this fu nd,lmcntal disorientation imparted by thc Western intrusion?
The discovery of relativism ,md plur:llislll gives 11 strong backing to elhnophi losophy. From the viewpoint of postillodcrnism. it makes sen8C to Speak of non-Western philosophies, bettcr still of the philosophies of cultures alien to technological drive. The irony is that such philosophies may well be more authentic thun the WeStern one, given their c ndeavor to escape subjectivity, to let being be. At any r,lte, besides selli ng aside the temptation to deny any phi losophic .. l dimension to traditional culturcs. thc rise of postmodcTlIism shows how ethnophilosophy crops up from the heart of Western philosophy. frOIll thc tear gencrmed by the encounter with relativism. Other ways of knOWing and being inauguratc the plurality of philosophy, and so thcir equal dignity in a decentered world. This filiatio n of ethnophilosophy to Western philosophy testifies to the seriousness of the Africlll1 cthnophilosophical school. The prccipitation to dismiss ethnophi losophy us an endorsement of colonial discourse should be resisted. Thc next chapters study some represelllalivc moments of African ethnophilosophical trcnd.
